OWASP Agentic AI Top 10 (2025-2026) — Attestix coverage
How each of the OWASP Top 10 risks for Agentic Applications (ASI01-ASI10) maps to Attestix's audit, identity, and credential primitives. Honest per-risk coverage with concrete evidence shapes — not marketing-spec "10/10".
The OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026 was published by the OWASP GenAI Security Project on 9 December 2025. It names the ten most critical security risks facing autonomous AI agents: ASI01 through ASI10. This page shows how Attestix maps each risk to a concrete, signed evidence shape that an auditor, regulator, or insurer can verify offline.
Why this matters
Plenty of frameworks claim "10/10 coverage" of OWASP lists. Attestix's claim is narrower and (we think) more useful: for every ASI risk, we point at a specific signed artefact — a W3C Verifiable Credential, a hash-chained audit event, or an on-chain anchor — that constitutes evidence relevant to that risk. We do not replace runtime guardrails (NeMo Guardrails, llm-guard, Guardrails AI, promptfoo). We are the forensic substrate that records what those guardrails decided and produces evidence a third party can verify without trusting our infrastructure.
The honest coverage table
| Risk | Mitigation surface in Attestix | Coverage | Evidence shape | Where to verify |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASI01:2026 Agent Goal Hijack — "Attackers manipulate agent goals, plans, or decision paths through direct or indirect instruction injection, causing agents to pursue unintended or malicious objectives." | UCAN delegation chains bound agent capability; verify_delegation flags actions outside scope; compliance_profile.intended_purpose provides a comparison baseline | strong-partial | Audit event + SecurityCheckCredential (v0.5) | attestix verify-delegation <chain> / verifyCredential() in @vibetensor/attestix |
| ASI02:2026 Tool Misuse & Exploitation — "Agents misuse or abuse tools through unsafe composition, recursion, or excessive execution, causing harmful side effects despite having valid permissions." | Every MCP tool invocation emits a chain-hashed audit event with actor + action + target_id; provenance log records every external call | partial | Per-call AuditEvent (chain-hashed) | attestix audit list --tag owasp.asi.ASI02 (v0.5 CLI flag) |
| ASI03:2026 Agent Identity & Privilege Abuse — "Delegated authority, ambiguous agent identity, or trust assumptions lead to unauthorized actions through impersonation or privilege escalation." | DID-based agent identity (did:key, did:web); UCAN v0.9 with parent-token verification + capability attenuation; revocation as a signed VC | full | DID document, UCAN tokens, audit event, SecurityCheckCredential (v0.5) | Offline verification walkthrough |
| ASI04:2026 Agentic Supply Chain Compromise — "External agents, tools, schemas, or prompts that agents dynamically trust or import become compromised, introducing malicious components." | record_model_lineage + record_training_data produce signed provenance entries; agent cards carry signed identity + capability declarations; OMS-compatible signatures planned (v0.5) | strong-partial | Provenance entries (signed, hash-chained), AgentIdentityCredential | attestix verify-provenance <agent-id> |
| ASI05:2026 Unexpected Code Execution — "Agent-generated or agent-triggered code executes without sufficient validation or isolation, enabling unauthorized system access." | Provenance log records every external-call entry the agent self-reports; v0.5 Article 15.4 check records the provider's sandbox-isolation declaration | record-only | Provenance entry + SecurityCheckCredential (v0.5, sandbox declaration only) | attestix audit list --action external_call |
| ASI06:2026 Memory & Context Poisoning — "Injection or leakage of agent memory or contextual state influences future reasoning or actions across sessions." | Per-agent hash-chained memory log; verify_chain detects any post-hoc tampering; the chain itself IS the tamper-evidence | strong-partial | Hash-chained provenance entries; verify_chain returns VerifyChainResult with structured failure pointer | attestix verify-chain <agent-id> / verify in the browser via the NPM package |
| ASI07:2026 Insecure Inter-Agent Communication — "Messages exchanged between agents, planners, and executors become manipulated through interception, injection, or spoofing." | InteractionCredential (W3C VC) wraps inter-agent messages with sender DID signature; agent cards published for capability discovery; offline verify_credential confirms authenticity | strong-partial | InteractionCredential (W3C VC, Ed25519-signed); optional Base L2 Sepolia anchor | attestix verify-credential <vc.json> / verifyCredential() in JS |
| ASI08:2026 Cascading Agent Failures — "Small agent failures propagate through connected systems, causing large-scale impact via tool chains or resource exhaustion." | Cross-agent causal links (v0.5 optional causal_parent_event_id field on record_action); per-agent audit chain enables post-mortem reconstruction; v0.5 incident-reporting collection | record-only | Per-agent audit chain + IncidentReportCredential (v0.5) | attestix bundle export --include-incidents for offline reconstruction |
| ASI09:2026 Human-Agent Trust Exploitation — "Human over-reliance on agents is exploited through misleading explanations, authority misrepresentation, or false certainty." | EU AI Act Article 14 (human oversight) checks in v0.5; ProviderAssertionCredential separates "system-verified" (green) from "provider-asserted" (blue) terminal states — by design we never auto-promote an assertion to verification | strong-partial | VerifiableCheckResult for Art 14 checks + ProviderAssertionCredential for human assertions | attestix verify-check <result-id> |
| ASI10:2026 Rogue Agents — "Agents act beyond intended objectives due to goal drift, collusion, reward hacking, or exceeding designed autonomy boundaries." | revoke_identity + revoke_credential as operator kill-switch (signed VC); UCAN expiry + attenuation bound blast radius; reputation-score downward drift detectable; v0.5 Art 14.4 stop-button declaration | strong-partial | Revocation VC, expired UCAN, ReputationScoreCredential, VerifiableCheckResult | attestix revoke <id> produces a signed revocation event verifiable via the public chain anchor |
OWASP source for every quoted description above: OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026.
Tally
- full: 1 (ASI03)
- strong-partial: 6 (ASI01, ASI04, ASI06, ASI07, ASI09, ASI10)
- partial: 1 (ASI02)
- record-only: 2 (ASI05, ASI08)
- out-of-scope: 0
We do not claim "10/10 mitigated". We claim 10/10 mapped to a concrete signed evidence shape. The difference matters — see What we don't do below.
Important caveat —
security_check_idships in v0.5.0. As of Attestix v0.4.0 (May 2026) the underlying events listed above are emitted today, but they are NOT yet tagged with the namespacedsecurity_check_iddiscriminator. The v0.5.0 release adds the field, theSecurityCheckCredentialsidecar VC, and theattestix audit --security-check owasp.asi.ASI<NN>CLI filter. Until then you can already query the underlying events byactionand reconstruct the same coverage manually.
What we don't do
The following are intentional non-goals. The most honest section of any security framework is the gap statement.
- No runtime prompt-injection detection. ASI01 (Goal Hijack) is mitigated after the fact by delegation-scope bounding and forensic replay; we do not analyse prompts in real time. Pair Attestix with NeMo Guardrails, Guardrails AI, llm-guard, or promptfoo for the runtime layer and let Attestix sign the evidence those tools produce.
- No code sandbox. ASI05 (Code Execution) is
record-onlybecause executing code safely is the host runtime's job (Docker, gVisor, Firecracker, language-level sandboxes). We record what was executed, by whom, and when — so post-incident forensics can attribute responsibility — but we do not block the call. - No real-time cascade detection. ASI08 (Cascading Failures) is observability (Datadog, Honeycomb, OpenTelemetry traces); cascade evidence is compliance (us). Operators detect cascades via their existing monitoring; Attestix produces the bundle export that reconstructs which agent touched what in what order.
- No hallucination detector. We do not score the truthfulness of LLM output. We sign what the agent did; downstream forensics catches drift against the declared
intended_purpose. - No assertion-to-verification promotion. Per the v0.5 anti-compliance-theater design: when a human asserts "yes, the residual risk is acceptable" or "yes, accuracy metrics are documented", the result transitions to the terminal state
assertion_recorded(rendered as a blue chip), NOT topassed=true(rendered green). Attestix never claims to have verified the substance of a human assertion.
How to verify our coverage yourself
Python / CLI
# List every audit event tagged with an OWASP ASI risk (v0.5.0+)
attestix audit list --security-check owasp.asi.ASI08
# Verify the chain integrity for an agent's audit log
attestix verify-chain <agent-did>
# Export a bundle including SecurityCheckCredentials (v0.5.0+)
attestix bundle export --include-security-credentials --out my-agent.atxbundleJavaScript / browser
npm install @vibetensor/attestiximport { verifyCredential } from "@vibetensor/attestix";
const result = await verifyCredential(securityCheckCredentialJson);
// result.valid === true if the Ed25519 signature over the JCS-canonical body
// matches the issuer DID's public key. No network calls; the DID is self-resolving
// (did:key) or fetched once and cached (did:web).The NPM package is Apache-2.0 licensed, runs in Node 18+ and modern browsers, depends only on @noble/curves, and ships with TypeScript types. A regulator with no Attestix install can verify any Attestix-issued credential by npm install-ing a 68.9 KB package.
On-chain anchor (Base L2 Sepolia testnet)
Tamper-evidence for the chain-of-evidence itself. See the Base L2 testnet anchor walkthrough.
attestix anchor audit-batch --agent <did> --network base-sepoliaMainnet schema registration is planned; testnet is the default target today.
Comparable disclosure
How other tools position themselves on agentic-AI security. We name approaches we found through public documentation; we do not disparage and we welcome corrections.
| Tool | Stated agentic-security position | Where to read more |
|---|---|---|
| Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit | Advertises 10/10 OWASP Agentic Top 10 coverage via policy-template attestation; emits CloudEvents to Azure Monitor; SPIFFE-style identity. Closest competitor by breadth. | github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit |
| airblackbox | 51 EU AI Act Article 9-15 checks with ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204 post-quantum) signing; library-only, offline verify.py. Strong on article-level depth; does not map to OWASP ASI explicitly. | github.com/airblackbox/airblackbox |
| NeMo Guardrails / Guardrails AI / llm-guard | Runtime LLM-output safety rails. Complementary to Attestix — they decide; we sign the decision. | github.com/NVIDIA/NeMo-Guardrails, guardrailsai.com, github.com/protectai/llm-guard |
| promptfoo / garak | LLM red-teaming + eval frameworks. Useful for ASI01/ASI06 pre-deployment hardening; do not produce signed compliance evidence. | promptfoo.dev, github.com/leondz/garak |
| sigstore / OpenSSF Model Signing | The de-facto signing layer for AI model artefacts. Attestix wraps OMS-compatible signatures on record_model_lineage (planned v0.5) rather than competing. | openssf.org/projects/model-signing |
See also
- EU AI Act compliance guide — how Attestix evidences high-risk system obligations.
- Offline verification walkthrough — verify any Attestix VC without network access.
- Base L2 testnet anchor walkthrough — pin evidence to a public chain.
- The internal mapping spec (proposal for v0.5.0) at
attestix-cloud-plan/22-OWASP-AGENTIC-TOP10-MAPPING.md— engineering-grade detail on thesecurity_check_idfield,SecurityCheckCredentialshape, and per-row PR plan.
npm package rename — @vibetensor/attestix → attestix
How to migrate to the bare 'attestix' name on npm (now matching pip install attestix on PyPI).
ISO/IEC 42001:2023 (AI Management System) — Attestix coverage
How Attestix's signed audit chains, Verifiable Credentials, and provenance records map to the ISO/IEC 42001:2023 Annex A controls and AIMS process clauses. Honest per-control coverage — Attestix is evidence tooling, not an AI Management System.